Four German military officials discussed what targets German-made Taurus missiles could potentially hit if Chancellor Olaf Scholz ever allowed them to be sent to Kyiv, and the call had been intercepted by Russian intelligence.

According to German authorities, the “data leak” was down to just one participant dialling in on an insecure line, either via his mobile or the hotel wi-fi.

The exact mode of dial-in is “still being clarified”, Germany has said.

“I think that’s a good lesson for everybody: never use hotel internet if you want to do a secure call,” Germany’s ambassador to the UK, Miguel Berger, told the BBC this week. Some may feel the advice came a little too late.

Eyebrows were raised when it emerged the call happened on the widely-used WebEx platform - but Berlin has insisted the officials used an especially secure, certified version.

Professor Alan Woodward from the Surrey Centre for Cyber Security says that WebEx does provide end-to-end encryption “if you use the app itself”.

But using a landline or open hotel wi-fi could mean security was no longer guaranteed - and Russian spies, it’s now supposed, were ready to pounce.

    • FuzzChef@feddit.de
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      7 months ago

      These VPN ad campaigns are incredibly detrimental to people’s understanding of security mechanisms in the internet.

      • RealJoL@feddit.de
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        7 months ago

        How would this not have helped out in this case? I imagine the Bundeswehr must have an organization-wide VPN which would render any MITM in a local Wifi network impossible, barring user error.

  • anticurrent@sh.itjust.works
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    7 months ago

    How is it possible to accomplish a man in the middle attack on a TLS secure connection ? Hotel wifi or not, unless something major like Singaporean gov interfered with the connection, forced forged certificates into his phone, I don’t see how this was put off by compromising the connection .

    I bet they are covering for the Fact that one of them has downloaded malware into his device to masturbate to a hot girl living next to him kinda ad. and then malware shared back that data to Russia. or they have a spy among them and Germany isn’t ready to admit having its defense forces compromised with Russian assets.

    • ErwinLottemann@feddit.de
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      7 months ago

      they were using an insecure method to connect with webex, so something like a dial-in number for using it without a computer i guess. that is probably not encrypted. the meeting could have been a fax anyway

  • sepiroth154@feddit.nl
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    7 months ago

    This doesnt add up… If the software was properly encrypted they shouldn’t have been able to carry out a man in the middle attack right?

    • vzq@lemmy.blahaj.zone
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      7 months ago

      Maybe he dialed in by telephone? It would be a complete boomer move, but I’ve seen people do it.

      • the_wise_wolf@feddit.de
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        7 months ago

        Yes, it is a boomer move. But don’t let Cisco off the hook. What kind of specially certified security feature is that, if it can be turned off so easily by accident.

      • fluxion@lemmy.world
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        7 months ago

        A researcher in cryptography in Berlin, Henning Seidler, believes the most likely theory is that the officer dialled in via his mobile phone and the call was picked up by spies’ antenna who can also “forward” the traffic onto the main, official antenna.

        Seems like the more likely theory

          • WhatAmLemmy@lemmy.world
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            7 months ago

            “Intelligence” services cost taxpayers billions a year, so the billion dollar question is why is it possible to dial in to “official” military communications over insecure channels at all?

            Why doesn’t the government run their own signal or matrix infra? Why are they paying Cisco, and introducing the numerous attack vectors of a proprietary optionally-encrypted service?

            The threat of surveillance capitalism isn’t just in the dragnet surveillance of the population. It’s in the profiteering of “partnerships” between private and public — the drive of corrupt and incompetent political and military leadership to direct funds to sub-optimal proprietary services and protocols, instead of leveraging public funding to contribute to open-source and make hardened systems ubiquitous.

      • zaphod@feddit.de
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        7 months ago

        He most likely did, at least from what I can deduce from the published recording.

    • lurch (he/him)@sh.itjust.works
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      7 months ago

      yes, one side has to automatically or manually accept a fake certificate/key to MITM end to end encryption. you know, like when your browser says “certificate error” and you click on advanced->accept anyway or something like that. if the software always accepts or he manually accepted one, the MITM guy can substitute his own encryption key/cert and decrypt and re-encrypt on the fly.

      • trollercoaster@feddit.de
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        7 months ago

        If you’re looking at who is allowed to issue trusted root certificates in common browsers and operating systems, nobody needs to accept nothing to have every possible man in the middle from every major country’s intelligence services already in there.

        • 4am@lemm.ee
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          7 months ago

          But that also depends on the issuer that WebEx used. If this really was a MITM without someone fucking up and bypassing a warning, whoever the root CA is issuing for WebEx can no longer be trusted.

          More likely they dialed in via mobile rather than use “Computer Audio” and that is easily defeated using a Stingray-type device.

          • trollercoaster@feddit.de
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            7 months ago

            Yes, in that case, it most likely was using an insecure channel to directly dial into the conference. Still, the entire certificate infrastructure is mere security theater, unless you’re actually going through the trouble of checking every individual certificate yourself.

            • anlumo@feddit.de
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              7 months ago

              That’s the open secret of the Web, all security on it is just fake. The list of root certificates is way too long to provide any security.

                • anlumo@feddit.de
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                  7 months ago

                  Public WiFi is the main problem, anybody connected to the same WiFi could potentially intercept all of your Web traffic. You could use a VPN to avoid that one.

        • Macros@feddit.de
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          7 months ago

          In this case shit software. For a secure conference software there should be no possibility for the user to accept invalid certificates.

          The developer always has to plan with what we call a DAU in germany (Dümmster anzunehmender User = dumbest user possible), and even that user should have no possibility to accidentally share a secure conference. So as a developer I would: Lock the user to certificates and encryption keys I deem secure and hook into the low level OS functions to grab the screen and disable them to prevent accidental sharing via software like Anydesk and the like which the user forgot to close. This would even interrupt the functions of a simple trojan on the PC.

          Of course a dedicated attacker with physical or admin access to the device could always break these. But then you have another big security breach.

    • the_wise_wolf@feddit.de
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      7 months ago

      Sounds like the encryption is automatically turned off if someone calls in via phone. So technically e2e encryption is supported, but it’s a shit design just waiting for someone to accidentally misuse it.

    • Jagermo@feddit.de
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      7 months ago

      It they used the client, yes. But in you dial in via sip, that opens up so many ways to screw up. Old software, open wifi, legacy hardware, you name it.

  • gapbetweenus@feddit.de
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    7 months ago

    Isn’t like very basic security advice to not use random connections for sensitive information? But than again it’s Germany, pretty sure he has his password written down on a sticky note.

  • notannpc@lemmy.world
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    7 months ago

    In a world where I can deploy end to end encrypted comms servers to an old computer in my house, the fucking military of any country should, at a minimum, require encryption to join meetings where military strategy is being discussed.