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Cake day: March 5th, 2024

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  • It seems like they are running out of time.

    They are running low on war material and are basically going from factory to front, but their production rate is 1/10 of their loss rate. We’ve already seen drops in losses (like artillery systems) compared to months ago, as they don’t have replacements, and have to lower the quantity they use.

    Their economy is imploding (interest rates just hit 20%). The non-defense industry can’t pay for their loans and 1/3 of companies are at risk of bankruptcy in the next 6 months. But they can’t stop the war or their economy (held up by defense industry) will crater into a deep recession.

    Their population is indifferent to the war, and doesn’t want to sacrifice more to help fight it. So unlikely to accept another mobilization or increased hardships.

    And Ukraine just got approval to use foreign weapons in Russia.

    So, yeah, Russia is probably a bit stressed at the moment.



  • They lost a lot at the beginning. Now they are left with what they can produce new and refurbish from storage.

    I’ve seen estimates of this being 300 to 2000 tanks annually (1 to 6 tanks daily). Since they are in a big push right now they are likely using up their operational reserves that they built up over months.

    So they can afford to lose more tanks than they “produce” daily, but how long they can keep up this attrition rate up is unclear. I’ve seen estimates that they have 3000ish tanks left in field/reserve/storage.

    However, it’s unclear what condition these stored tanks are in. They likely used the newer tanks and those needing the least refurbishment first, leaving the only the dregs (old and heavily damaged) left.

    Edit: added a couple clarifying words.


  • I’ve heard the Russian economy is overheating and is going to have major problems by mid 2025 (interest rates already 20+% and home mortgage rate have hit a peak at 40%). I figured that would mean that the Russian war machine would start having massive problems by the end of 2025.

    But the way Russia is pushing so hard, after a Trump victory and expected US support withdrawal and pressure to negotiate, makes me think they are trying to begin negotiation on Day 1 of a Trump presidency. Which I would infer means they are in a worse position than I expected and could have massive war machine problems by mid 2025.

    If Ukraine was then able to, and did continue, fighting until the end of 2025, they may start making major gains in the war against the broken Russian war machine. Putin may call a second mobilization wave to slow the Ukrainians but that may be counterproductive by causing general unrest and protestation against the war.





  • It may be because they are running out of reserve Soviet equipment and are forced to rely on meat assaults to keep up the pressure.

    I’ve noticed the number of artillery system destroyed per day is about half (~25-35/day) of what it was for most of the past year (~70/day).

    Same with APCs, the number seems to have halved and the “vehicles and fuel tanks” number has risen to compensate. To me, that indicates the Russians are riding into battle on unarmed vehicles (motorcycles, golf carts, regular cars/trucks, etc.) and are more suseptible to becoming a casualty than earlier in the war.

    If that were the case, the Russians pressure/assaults may not have increased as significantly as the casualty number increase would indicate.



  • I suspect the storage facilities are close to being completed emptied of working or easily fixable pieces and all that’s left is scrap/spare part pieces.

    They may be receiving, or could receive in the future, artillery pieces from allies (ex. NK) that could change their ability to keep up losses.

    Regarding China, I don’t think China would militarily invade a stable Russia (not civil wared). I think it’s more likely they will economically dominate them, with the implicit threat of militarily/covert action if Russia tries and recover their economic sovereignty in those dominated regions.