it has higher latency, even variable latency if you set up variable hops, and everyone routes the traffic of a lot of other users, so a lot of data they can gather from timing info is noise by default
Yes it has better defenses against timing attacks. Just alone the fact that multiple packets are bundled together makes it harder to identify the route a single package used.
Also, it seems that I2P is more vulnerable against deanonymization when leaving the hidden network, i think the official I2P faq has some info about that, but have not read up upon it myself.
Also, it seems that I2P is more vulnerable against deanonymization when leaving the hidden network, i think the official I2P faq has some info about that, but have not read up upon it myself.
on a quick look I did not find such a mention, but in any case in addition to that, I2P users often don’t have such a fortified browser as Tor users do, so that’s also something to count with.
and maybe it’s not a good idea either to just reconfigure a Tor browser profile for I2P
isn’t it less vulnerable, though?
it has higher latency, even variable latency if you set up variable hops, and everyone routes the traffic of a lot of other users, so a lot of data they can gather from timing info is noise by default
Yes it has better defenses against timing attacks. Just alone the fact that multiple packets are bundled together makes it harder to identify the route a single package used.
Also, it seems that I2P is more vulnerable against deanonymization when leaving the hidden network, i think the official I2P faq has some info about that, but have not read up upon it myself.
on a quick look I did not find such a mention, but in any case in addition to that, I2P users often don’t have such a fortified browser as Tor users do, so that’s also something to count with.
and maybe it’s not a good idea either to just reconfigure a Tor browser profile for I2P